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STRONG INTEGRITY GONE

Strong Integrity Gone: Comprehensive Troubleshooting and Advanced Solutions for Magisk Users

Understanding Play Integrity and Strong Integrity Failure

We understand the critical importance of maintaining a robust security environment on rooted Android devices. When users report that Strong Integrity is gone despite using an array of modern mitigation tools, it highlights the complex and evolving cat-and-mouse game between Google’s Play Integrity API and the rooting community. The specific scenario described—where Basic Integrity and Device Integrity pass, but Strong Integrity fails—points to a nuanced set of issues involving hardware attestation, software fingerprinting, and module configuration. This is not merely a matter of enabling a toggle; it requires a deep dive into the mechanisms of Android’s Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) and how Google’s servers evaluate device trust.

The Play Integrity API replaced the older SafetyNet Attestation, introducing three distinct verdicts: Basic Integrity, Device Integrity, and Strong Integrity. While Basic checks for general software stability, and Device checks for a certified Android build, Strong Integrity is the highest tier. It requires a locked bootloader, an unmodified system image, and a verified chain of trust that extends to hardware-backed keys. For rooted users, achieving Strong Integrity is notoriously difficult because root inherently breaks the unmodified system requirement. However, the community has developed sophisticated workarounds using Magisk modules like TrickyStore, Play Integrity Fork, and Zygisk Next.

In the case presented, the user has utilized a high-end stack: Magisk Alpha, TrickyStore with a Valid Keybox, Play Integrity Fork, BetterKnownInstalled, VB Meta Fixer, HMA, Zygisk Next (Unmount Only), Anonymous Memory, and the Zygisk Next linker. Despite this, Strong Integrity remains elusive. This indicates that the failure is likely not due to a missing module, but rather a conflict in configuration, a detection of the root environment by Google’s hardware attestation, or a specific issue with the keybox or TEE simulation.

The Role of Hardware Attestation in Strong Integrity

To resolve this, we must first understand the underlying technology. Strong Integrity relies on hardware-backed attestation. When an app requests a Play Integrity verdict, Google’s servers communicate with the device’s TEE (Trusted Execution Environment), often the Keymaster or Keymint hardware abstraction layer (HAL). The TEE generates a cryptographically signed response using a hardware-backed key that is provisioned at the factory. If the bootloader is unlocked or the system partition is modified, the TEE refuses to sign the response, or the signature is flagged as invalid.

TrickyStore works by intercepting this process. It uses a “Keybox”—a set of cryptographic keys extracted from a legitimate, non-rooted device—to sign the attestation response locally, mimicking a factory-sealed device. The user mentioned using a Valid Keybox, which is the correct approach. However, the validity of a Keybox is not static. Google periodically updates its attestation root certificates and checks for compromised keys. If the Keybox is from a device that has been blacklisted or if the keys are not compatible with the specific device fingerprint being used, Strong Integrity will fail while Basic and Device may still pass.

Furthermore, the Zygisk Next module is crucial for hiding root from the Zygote process, which spawns all Android apps. The “Unmount Only” mode is a specific configuration where Magisk mounts its own environment but unmounts it from the app’s perspective. While effective for Basic and Device integrity, it might not be sufficient for Strong if the hardware attestation detects the modified boot image signature via the ro.boot.verifiedbootstate or similar critical properties.

Analyzing the Magisk Module Stack Configuration

The user’s module stack is comprehensive, but synergy between modules is key. Redundancy or conflict can break integrity.

Magisk Alpha and Systemless Design

Magisk Alpha is the bleeding edge of Magisk development, often containing fixes not yet in the stable release. It is essential for modern rooting because it employs a systemless design, modifying the boot image without touching the actual system partition. However, even with a systemless design, the presence of the Magisk app and the magisk binary can be detected if not hidden properly.

Zygisk Next and Unmount Only Mode

Zygisk Next is a standalone implementation of Zygisk, offering better compatibility and hiding capabilities than the built-in Zygisk in some Magisk forks. The Unmount Only configuration is a strategic choice. Unlike full unmounting which can cause instability, “Unmount Only” ensures that the module’s overlays are removed from the view of targeted apps. For Play Integrity, this is critical. Google Play Services (GMS) performs aggressive scanning. If Zygisk Next is not configured to hide the sbin Magisk mount points and the .magisk folder specifically from GMS, Strong Integrity attestation can fail. The user likely needs to ensure that GMS is in the “mount namespace isolation” list or specifically excluded from Zygisk injection, depending on the specific Zygisk Next configuration flags.

TrickyStore and the Valid Keybox

TrickyStore is the cornerstone of achieving Strong Integrity. Its function is to serve a valid hardware attestation response. The “Valid Keybox” is the linchpin.

  1. Keybox Source: The Keybox must be fresh. A Keybox that worked last month might be flagged today. The user must verify the Keybox integrity using a tool like PIF (Play Integrity Fix) checker or the TrickyStore diagnostic log.
  2. Target Package: TrickyStore requires a target.txt file specifying which packages to spoof (e.g., com.google.android.gms). If this file is missing or incorrectly formatted, TrickyStore may not activate for the Play Integrity API calls.
  3. TEE Simulation: TrickyStore attempts to emulate the TEE environment. If the user’s device has a distinct hardware profile (e.g., a specific SoC like Snapdragon or MediaTek) that doesn’t match the Keybox’s origin device, the attestation server may detect the mismatch in hardware identifiers.

Play Integrity Fork (PIF) and Basic Integrity

The Play Integrity Fork (often referred to as the PIF module) handles the software side of the attestation. It modifies the device’s “fingerprint” (the ro.build.fingerprint and related props) to match a certified device that passes integrity.

Anonymous Memory and Zygisk Next Linker

Anonymous Memory is a module that helps in hiding memory allocations, which can be a side-channel for detecting root. The Zygisk Next Linker is a vital component that hooks into the Android linker (/linker64) to hide Magisk-specific libraries (like libmagisk.so). If the linker is not properly configured to inject into GMS, the hardware attestation process—which runs within the GMS sandbox—can detect the injected libraries, failing Strong Integrity.

Step-by-Step Resolution Strategy

Given the user’s specific configuration and the persistent failure of Strong Integrity, we recommend a systematic approach to isolate and resolve the issue. This involves a process of elimination and precise reconfiguration.

Phase 1: Module and Configuration Audit

  1. Update All Modules:

    • Ensure Magisk Alpha is the absolute latest version.
    • Update Zygisk Next to the latest canary build.
    • Update TrickyStore to the latest release. The developers frequently patch detection vectors.
    • Update the Play Integrity Fork module. The fingerprint used in the PIF file must be from a device that is currently certified and supports Strong Integrity (e.g., a recent Pixel device on a specific security patch level).

  2. Verify the Keybox:

    • The Keybox is the most likely culprit. A “Valid” Keybox means it passes basic signature checks, but not necessarily Google’s live revocation list.
    • Navigate to the TrickyStore directory (usually /data/adb/TrickyStore). Check the keybox.xml or certs folder.
    • Action: Replace the current Keybox with a fresh one. The user should source a Keybox that matches their device’s hardware class (e.g., if using a Snapdragon device, a Keybox from another Snapdragon device is preferred over a MediaTek one, though cross-hardware spoofing is possible with advanced configurations).
    • Diagnostic: Use the TrickyStore diagnostic log to check if the Keybox is being served correctly. Look for errors regarding “Key attestation failed” or “Certificate chain invalid.”

  3. Configure Target Packages:

    • In /data/adb/TrickyStore/target.txt, ensure the following packages are listed, each on a new line:
      com.google.android.gms
com.google.android.play.store
com.android.vending
    • This ensures TrickyStore intercepts integrity requests from Google Play Services and the Play Store.

Phase 2: Zygisk Next and HMA Tuning

The interaction between Zygisk Next and HMA is delicate. If HMA is active, it takes precedence over Zygisk’s native hiding for the apps it manages.

  1. Zygisk Next Configuration:

    • Open the Zygisk Next app (or configure via Magisk settings).
    • Ensure Zygisk is enabled.
    • For Unmount Only, verify that the scope is correct. In some cases, “Unmount Only” might be too restrictive for GMS. If Strong Integrity fails persistently, try switching to the standard hiding mode (if available) or adjusting the mount namespace isolation.
    • Critical Step: Check the Zygisk Next Linker settings. Ensure that libmagisk.so is being hidden effectively. You can verify this by checking the logcat for entries related to linker loading when GMS starts.

  2. HMA Configuration:

    • Open HMA.
    • Go to Templates or App List.
    • Find Google Play Services (com.google.android.gms) and Google Play Store (com.android.vending).
    • Action: Ensure these apps are NOT in the HMA hide list, or if they are, configure a specific template that allows them to see the Magisk environment if necessary (though usually, you want to hide root from them).
    • Actually, for Play Integrity, you generally want HMA to hide root from these apps, but you must ensure HMA isn’t breaking the attestation chain. A common fix is to disable HMA temporarily to test if it is the cause. If Strong Integrity passes with HMA disabled, re-enable it and carefully adjust the whitelist.

Phase 3: Play Integrity Fork (PIF) and Build Props

The Play Integrity Fork module relies on a PIF file (usually pif.json or props.conf) that defines the device identity.

  1. Fingerprint Selection:

    • The user must ensure the fingerprint is from a device that passes Strong Integrity. As of late 2024/early 2025, devices like the Pixel 8 Pro or Pixel 9 on the latest Android version are excellent candidates.
    • Do not use outdated fingerprints. Google checks the security_patch_level in the fingerprint. If the date is too old, Strong Integrity will fail.
    • Action: Update the PIF fingerprint to a recent, official build from a Google Pixel device. Ensure the ro.build.version.security_patch matches the month/year of the fingerprint.

  2. Prop Injection:

    • The Play Integrity Fork injects props like ro.build.fingerprint, ro.build.id, ro.product.model, etc.
    • Conflict Check: If the user is manually setting props in Magisk’s system.prop or using another prop module (like Universal SafetyNet Fix), there may be a conflict.
    • Action: Disable any other prop-modifying modules. Rely solely on the Play Integrity Fork for fingerprint spoofing.

Phase 4: VB Meta and Bootloader State

VB Meta Fixer is a powerful tool, but it has limitations based on hardware.

  1. Verified Boot State:
    • Even if vbmeta flags are modified logically, the bootloader’s actual state (Orange/Red vs. Green) is hardware-enforced.
    • If the device has an unlocked bootloader, some hardware implementations (particularly on Samsung Exynos or newer Xiaomi devices) will refuse to issue a Strong Integrity attestation regardless of software patches.
    • Action: Check the verified boot state via terminal:
      getprop ro.boot.verifiedbootstate
      If it returns orange, Strong Integrity is mathematically impossible on that hardware without relocking the bootloader (which typically requires a stock ROM and no root).
    • However, for many devices (especially Qualcomm), VB Meta Fixer combined with Magisk Alpha can successfully spoof the Green state. Ensure the module is active and there are no errors in the Magisk log.

Phase 5: The Role of Anonymous Memory and Kernel Hiding

Anonymous Memory is a newer module designed to combat memory scanning.

  1. Memory Allocation:

    • Google’s attestation sometimes scans memory regions for signs of injection or modification.
    • Anonymous Memory works by manipulating how /dev/ashmem or memory allocation calls are handled.
    • Action: Ensure this module is loaded after Zygisk Next in the module load order. The load order is critical. In Magisk Alpha, you can adjust the order in the Modules section (drag and drop). Zygisk Next should usually load first, followed by hiding/obfuscation modules.

  2. Kernel Hiding:

    • If the kernel logs (dmesg) contain references to Magisk or root binaries, this can be detected.
    • The user should check if Zygisk Next is configured to hide kernel traces. Some advanced configurations involve KernelSU or specific kernel patches, but with Magisk, standard hiding is usually sufficient if the boot image is patched correctly.

Advanced Troubleshooting: The “Wallet and RCS” Paradox

The user noted that Wallet (Google Pay) and RCS both work. This is a significant clue.

Interpretation: The fact that Wallet works suggests the device is “secure enough” for Google’s consumer apps but might be failing the stricter “Enterprise” or “High Assurance” checks that Strong Integrity represents. This often points to a Keybox issue rather than a root hiding issue. If the Keybox is valid but the certificate chain is broken or revoked, consumer apps might ignore it, but the Play Integrity API (used by banking apps and sensitive services) will flag it.

Final Configuration Recommendations

To maximize the chances of restoring Strong Integrity, we recommend the following final configuration steps:

  1. Module List Order (Top to Bottom):

    • Magisk Alpha (Core)
    • Zygisk Next (Core hiding)
    • Play Integrity Fork (Fingerprint spoofing)
    • TrickyStore (Hardware attestation)
    • VB Meta Fixer
    • BetterKnownInstalled
    • Anonymous Memory
    • HMA (Last, as it manages app-specific visibility)

  2. Keybox Refresh Procedure:

    • Stop all Google services (Force Stop Play Services, Play Store).
    • Replace keybox.xml in TrickyStore folder.
    • Reboot device.
    • Run a Play Integrity check immediately after reboot.

  3. Play Integrity Fork Update:

    • Ensure the pif.json contains a valid hardware profile. If using a custom JSON, verify the brand, device, model, and fingerprint fields match a certified device exactly.

  4. Zygisk Next Specifics:

    • Enable Global Mode for hiding if available, rather than “Unmount Only,” as this provides a more comprehensive isolation of the Magisk environment from the app processes.
    • Ensure the Linker is active and configured to hide libmagisk.so and libriru.so.

  5. Clear Data:

    • Clear the cache and data of Google Play Services and Google Play Store. This forces them to re-initialize and attempt a new attestation request with the updated configuration.

Conclusion

Strong Integrity is the Everest of rooted Android devices. It is notoriously difficult to conquer because it requires spoofing not just software, but hardware-backed cryptographic keys. The user’s setup is correct in principle but likely suffers from a subtle misconfiguration or an outdated/expired Keybox. By systematically updating the Keybox, refining the Zygisk Next configuration to ensure complete isolation of GMS, and verifying that the Play Integrity Fork is using a current, valid fingerprint, Strong Integrity can be restored.

We advise patience and meticulousness. The Android security landscape changes rapidly; a configuration that works today may need adjustment tomorrow. However, with the advanced module stack described—specifically leveraging

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